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When, about two weeks ago, I was asked by my friend Dr. Mario Scerri to 
address you, my first reaction was to say politely "no thank you". What can a 
lawyer say which can be of interest to medical people gathered to discuss 
topics in the field of forensic medicine? But then I thought of the many close 
encounters I have had, both as a prosecutor and now as a judge, with doctors 
in the court room, encounters that have been in some cases rewarding, in oth­
ers disappointing, in some cases positively entertaining, in others nightmar­
ish. What is that makes the doctor's role in court, particularly in criminal 
proceedings, so captivating for the media, so much discussed and criticised by 
lawyers, and so very often disliked by doctors themselves? After all the doctor 
in court- unless he happens to be the accused or unless he is giving evidence 
on something totally unrelated to his medical practice - should be saying in 
court very much the same thing he would have said in a case conference with 
colleagues or in a written report submitted to a patient or to whoever requests 
such a report (e.g. an insurance company). The answer is both simple and 
complicated. The simple answer is that the moment a doctor is transposed 
from a purely medical setting into a legal or courtroom setting, the "rules of 
the game" are changed. The complicated answer is linked to the more or less 
complex rules of the adversarial legal system, to which are added what to 
many may seem as quaintnesses and endemic inconveniences peculiar to the 
Maltese legal system. 
Let me try to explain, at the same time promising you that I will keep my 
intervention as brief as possible. 
As a rule no one likes to be summoned to give evidence in court. This is, of 
course, true of the housewife as of the neurosurgeon, with the difference that 
the latter's agenda for the particular morning would have been prepared weeks 
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or months in advance and upsetting it could in practice mean serious incon­
venience to many third parties unconnected with the court proceedings. The 
present position in Malta is that it is left up to individual judges and magis­
trates to adopt measures to ensure as far as possible that doctors summoned to 
give evidence in court do not waste hours in the corridors of the court building 
before they are called to the witness stand. In civil proceedings before the 
Superior Courts the problem is to a large extent obviated by the fact that most 
cases are heard by appointment, which means that a particular time of the 
morning or ( with some judges) of the afternoon is set for a particular case. The 
witness or witnesses are thus also summoned for a particular time rather than 
asked to be in court from nine in the morning. The situation is different, how­
ever, before the Magistrates' Courts in criminal proceedings and before the 
Court of Criminal Appeal in its inferior jurisdiction. Here the sheer number of 
cases makes it impractical to have them heard by appointment: they are all set 
for hearing at nine in the morning, and then the judge or magistrate proceeds 
by order according to the list. Even so measures may be, and in fact have 
been, adopted to reduce the time a doctor spends in court. Soon after my ap­
pointment to the Bench in March of 1994, it was agreed between Mr. Justice 
Victor Caruana Colombo and myself 2 to send a memo to the Chief Govern­
ment Medical Officer asking him to advise all doctors -whether in Govern­
ment service or not and whether consultants or GP's -that whenever they 
were summoned to give evidence in their professional capacity before the 
Court of Criminal Appeal, they could, immediately upon arriving in court at 
nine, inform one of the court marshals, who would then inform the presiding 
judge, and the case in which that doctor had to give evidence would then be 
heard before other cases. If the doctor could not be in court at nine, he was 
advised to inform the Deputy Registrar by phone, giving either the time when 
he would be available that morning or, if it was impossible for him to make it 
that day, to indicate another day and/or time. I must say that this arrangement 
has worked to the satisfaction not only of doctors but also of the parties to the 
case, because if the court is informed that a doctor cannot appear on a particu­
lar day, the case is immediately adjourned. 
The situation tends to be a bit different before the Criminal Court, that is in 
trials by jury. Here it is up to prosecuting counsel to decide at what stage to 
produce the witness who happens to be a doctor. If the doctor is being pro­
duced as a witness for the defence, it would be up to defence counsel to decide 
at what stage to produce him. Although every effort is made by counsel to 
accommodate the needs of doctors, in practice it is not possible for them to 
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give other than a general idea of when the particular doctor will be called to 
give evidence, for example, in the morning of a given day or in the afternoon. 
Doctors must appreciate that although they may be scheduled to give evi­
dence at a particular time, that schedule may be totally upset by an unexpect­
edly long cross-examination of a previous witness or witnesses, or by some 
unexpected point of law being raised and requiring lengthy oral submissions 
and a court ruling. 
More recently even the legislator has intervened in an attempt to cut down on 
the time spent by doctors in court. By an amendment introduced last year3 to 
section 646 of the Criminal Code, medical certificates are now admissible as 
evidence and are, until the contrary is proved, evidence of their contents with­
out the need of the person issuing them having to be summoned to give evi­
dence at the trial. For a certificate to be so admissible certain conditions must 
be satisfied. ( 1) the certificate must be issued by a registered medical practi­
tioner or a registered dental surgeon; (2) it must concern his examination of a 
person (whether alive or dead) or a bodily harm suffered by, or a physical or 
mental infirmity afflicting, such person; (3) it must bear the clearly legible 
stamp of the medical practitioner or dental surgeon, showing his name, pro­
fessional qualifications, expertise and address; and ( 4) last but not least, the 
certificate must be confirmed by the affidavit of the medical practitioner or 
dental surgeon. Such affidavit may be made before a magistrate, before a 
number of court officials authorised to administer oaths, or before a commis­
sioner for oaths, including those notaries who have applied for and been ap­
pointed commissioners for oaths. If all these conditions concur, the doctor or 
dentist issuing the certificate need not appear to give evidence in court. How­
ever either party, or the court ex officio, may nevertheless insist that he appear 
and give evidence in court and viva voce. This in practice means that when­
ever a doctor issues a certificate which is likely to end up exhibited in criminal 
proceedings, it is in his interest to ensure not only that he has complied with 
all the requirements I have just mentioned, but also that the contents of the 
certificate is as clear (by which I mean also clearly legible), precise and as 
comprehensive as possible. If it is not, either prosecuting counsel or defence 
counsel or both, or the court ex officio, may feel the need to question further 
the doctor on his findings, by summoning him to appear in court\ 
And this brings me to a more substantial issue: the role of the doctor in court 
proceedings. Although forensic medicine has a role to play in both civil and 
criminal proceedings, there is no doubt that in practice, if not in the popular 
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mind, it is generally associated with criminal proceedings. What is generally 
not appreciated, sometimes even by doctors themselves, is that a criminal trial 
proceeds along a set of rules avowedly designed to ensure that the final out­
come of the trial - the verdict - reflects the truth. Our system of criminal 
procedure is essentially adversarial. I emphasise the word "essentially" be­
cause although one can detect traces of the inquisitorial system in committal 
proceedings - better known to you as "il-kumpilazzjoni" - by and large the 
rules governing the conduct of a trial and the admissibility of evidence have 
been copied from the English system which, as you may know, is eminently 
adversarial. Essentially the adversarial system means that the production of 
the evidence for or against a particular hypothesis is left entirely in the hands 
of the parties, with the court and, where appropriate, the jurors, acting as inde­
pendent and final arbiters of the truth or otherwise of that hypothesis. On one 
important point, however, our system has departed from the English system, 
and that is on the question of expert evidence in a court of criminal justice. 
And it is in this context of expert evidence that the role of the doctor falls to be 
examined. 
Unlike the English system, with which some of you, I am sure, are familiar, 
where either party to the criminal proceedings may produce his or her expert 
witness, in the Maltese Criminal Justice system experts are appointed by the 
court. This was also true until recently in civil proceedings in Malta. The 1995 
amendments to the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure have changed 
all that. A new provision - section 563A - now provides that "where a 
person is called as a witness, his opinion on any relevant matter on which he is 
qualified to give expert evidence shall be admissible in evidence only if, in the 
opinion of the court, he is suitably qualified in the relevant matter". In prac­
tice this means that either party in a civil case may now produce his or her 
expert witness, including expert medical witness. The court, of course, retains 
the power to appoint its own expert - called a referee in civil proceedings -
and will no doubt appoint such a referee if the experts produced by the parties 
do not agree in their findings or conclusions. 
But in criminal proceedings the old position prevails: a witness is only an 
expert witness if he has been so appointed by the court. This is a point, which, 
from my experience as a lawyer and a judge, doctors sometimes fail to appre­
ciate. Doctors who, not without justification, believe that they are the experts 
in medical matters, often take the witness stand in the mistaken belief that 
they can give evidence as experts. As I am sure most of you know the basic, if 
L_ 
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not the only, difference between an expert witness and an ordinary witness is 
that the former may, in the course of his testimony, express an opinion based 
on his knowledge or expertise, whereas the latter - the ordinary witness -
can only testify as to facts which are within his personal knowledge, that is 
facts which were directly observed or perceived by him through one of his 
senses. 
The rationale of the distinction between an opinion and a fact is this: the draw­
ing of inferences is said to be the function of the judge or jury, while it is the 
business of a witness to state facts. Thus, for instance, the doctor who has 
examined in the emergency or casualty department of a hospital a person who 
is the presumed victim of a stabbing, or the surgeon who has opened up the 
victim to explore the wound properly, can only describe the wound, its shape, 
extent of penetration, the internal organs which have been damaged, the ex­
tent of the internal haemorrhage, and so on; but, strictly speaking, they may 
not venture to state whether the wound is compatible with any type of instru­
ment or with a particular instrument which may already be a court exhibit 
because, always strictly speaking, they would be expressing an opinion. In­
deed, even the statement as to whether the person was at any time in danger of 
loss of life is, properly speaking, an expression of opinion. In practice, how­
ever, our courts of criminal justice have invariably allowed the doctor and the 
surgeon in these situations to express such opinions. 
The question, of course, is whether such a practice is in line with the law 
("secundum legem") or whether it goes against the law ("contra legem"). I 
would say it is neither, and that it may more properly be conceived as "praeter 
legem" - beyond the law - that is a legitimate interpretation of the law 
going beyond the original and narrow interpretation given to the provision of 
the Criminal Code dealing with the appointment of experts. Section 650( 1) of 
the Criminal Code provides that "In all cases where for the examination of 
any person or thing special knowledge or skill is required a reference to ex­
perts shall be ordered". The law further specifies that the experts shall be 
"chosen by the court" and that "as a rule" they "shall be appointed in an un­
even number". The operative words are "examination of any person or thing". 
In the majority of cases these words do not pose a problem. The doctor exam­
ining and describing the corpse at the scene of the crime before it is removed 
to the mortuary, the pathologists performing the autopsy, the chemist or other 
person appointed to examine the blood, the tool-mark examiner, the finger­
print expert - these are all in practice examining a person or a thing. But 
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what about the photographer at the scene of the crime? Can he be said to be 
"examining a person or a thing" or is he simply "keeping a record of a person 
or thing" through the medium of the lens and film? Yet we keep appointing 
expert photographers whenever the inquiring magistrate or a court requires 
photographs to be taken. Or take the case when what is required is, say, an 
opinion as to the effect of a given drug on a particular organ of the body. No 
examination of a given person or thing is involved. Must the court, in such a 
case, do without an expert opinion simply because no examination is involved? 
I would venture to say no: in such a case an expert may be appointed by the 
court. It can legitimately be said that in the practice of our courts of criminal 
justice the expression "examination of a person or thing" has been understood 
to include every situation where an expert opinion is required. 
In other words, whenever the court is of the view that the judge or the jurors 
are not properly equipped to draw the right inferences from the facts stated by 
a witness because they lack special knowledge or skill, expert opinion is ad­
mitted. And nowhere does our law state that a person's appointment as an 
expert must precede his examination of the person or thing. The law merely 
provides (in section 650(5) of the Criminal Code) that "the court shall, when­
ever it is expedient, give to the experts the necessary directions, and allow 
them a time within which to make their report". Clearly it would not be expe­
dient, much less necessary, to give directions to the doctor who has already 
examined in casualty the presumed victim. Therefore, when the court allows 
the doctor in the casualty department or the surgeon who has performed the 
urgent intervention to express an opinion it is in effect appointing them ex 
post facto as experts. What the court must be satisfied of is that that doctor or 
that surgeon has the required expertise to express such an opinion. In my ex­
perience it is not uncommon for doctors, especially junior doctors, on being 
asked for an opinion on gunshot wounds or even other type of wounds, to say 
quite frankly that they would rather not answer the question as they feel that it 
is outside their competence. 
When a doctor is giving evidence in court, whether as an expert or as an ordi­
nary witness, he very often has to contend not only with the court atmosphere 
with which he may be more or less unfamiliar, but also with unsympathetic 
lawyers and impatient judges. Whatever the doctor has to say, it is most likely 
to be of help to only one of the parties to the proceedings. The other party will 
therefore, in cross-examination, attempt to demolish or discredit the evidence 
of the doctor. Doctors very often feel that their medical reputation is threat-
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ened in cross-examination. The purpose of a cross-examination is not to dis­
credit a doctor's reputation - though I will not say that some unscrupulous 
lawyers will not attempt to do so - but to lessen as much as possible the 
probative value, that is the weight, which the judge or the jury are to attach to 
the doctor's evidence. The doctor who prefers a particular medical opinion 
must, irrespective of however honest he is about that opinion, concede that 
there may be others who will not agree with that opinion, that he may be 
wrong in his conclusion, and must therefore be prepared to revise it if cogent 
arguments are brought to his attention. If no such arguments are advanced he 
is, of course, to stick to his opinion. My experience as a lawyer and a judge 
has taught me that the most credible medical expert, especially with jurors, is 
the unpretentious doctor who is prepared to accept both the limitations of 
science and his own limitations while at the same time standing strongly by 
the opinion which he believes to be the correct one. In this context I can do no 
better than quote from a rather old text-book, John Glaister's eleventh (1962) 
edition of his "Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology": 
"In giving evidence," he says, "there are certain principles which should never 
be forgotten by the medical witness. The language used in the witness-box 
should be clear, concise, and as untechnical as possible. Such terms as "syn­
cope", "comatose", "highly vascular", "oedematous" and others should not 
be used. It is impossible to expect a jury to know what is meant by the terms 
"pericardium", "meninges" and "calvarium", but the substitution of "heart­
bag", "brain-coverings" and "skullcap" or "vault of the skull", will make 
matters clear. 
"The language should be concise. Adjectives of degree, especially superla­
tives, should be used sparingly, and only when absolutely necessary, since 
their use may be regarded as biased opinion, and this discounts the value of 
the evidence. The voluble witness is often a godsend to opposing counsel with 
a weak case, since the witness saying more than is required is apt to say more 
than he means, and in doing so increases his vulnerability while under cross­
examination. Categorical answers, where possible, are the best, and when not 
possible answers should be concise and clear. 
"The replies of a witness should invariably be courteous. This is not difficult 
during examination-in chief, since both witness and examiner are in accord, 
but it frequently becomes less easy in cross-examination, when the object of 
the cross-examiner is to weaken, or if possible, negative the evidence given in 
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the previous examination. However trying the situation may be, the witness 
should keep the fact clearly before him that he is giving expression to honest 
opinion, and that he has but consistently to hold by what he has formerly said, 
and to give fully the reasons for his belief, to convince the court of his sincer­
ity. It is usually with reference to opinions that differences between counsel 
and witness arise. 
"It may be of assistance to the witness under cross-examination to bear in 
mind that it is the business of the cross-examiner to make the best case he can 
for his client. Calm but persistent restatement of former evidence will sooner 
or later break down even the most pressing cross-examiner, and a witness may 
rely upon the judge interfering when he considers that counsel is overstepping 
the bounds of legitimate cross-examination. In short, if the witness can pre­
serve himself free of the assumption that cross-examining counsel is his natu­
ral enemy, and if he does not, therefore, assume the mental attitude appropri­
ate to that view, he will leave the witness box, if otherwise he has been well 
prepared, with credit. There are occasions, however, upon which it is abso­
lutely necessary for a medical witness to maintain a very firm attitude, and to 
decline strongly to have words attributed which have not been stated. Occa­
sionally cross-examining counsel may ask a question, which is based upon a 
statement which he desires the witness to understand he has already made in 
reply to a previous question, the answer to which tends to put an entirely 
different complexion upon the tenor of his evidence. If the witness is col­
lected he will detect the misstatement and at once challenge it.... 
"Evidence should always be given distinctly, deliberately and audibly. It has 
often been said by judges that no witnesses are so difficult to be heard and to 
be understood as medical witness; difficult to be heard from want of clearness 
in articulation, and difficult to be understood by reason of the nature of the 
evidence." (pp. 46-48). 
Allow me, as a judge, to add a few other comments to that. Sometimes doctors 
are asked, in examination or cross-examination, to state whether or not a par­
ticular hypothesis put to them by counsel is either possible or probable. Very 
often the importance of a question put in such terms, and especially the impor­
tance of the answer given thereto, is not immediately apparent to the witness. 
The answer to questions put in this way, however, can be decisive for the 
prosecution or for the defence, and therefore decisive also from the point of 
view of the judge or jury. The reason is to be found in the rules governing the 
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degree of proof that must be forthcoming from the prosecution to prove its 
case, and the degree of proof that may be forthcoming from the accused in 
order to nullify the prosecution's case. It is therefore important for medical 
witnesses, particularly medical experts, to be aware of the legal implications 
of the words "possible" and "probable". It is trite knowledge that the prosecu­
tion must prove its case against the accused "beyond reasonable doubt". This 
means that at the end of the day whoever has to judge on the facts - whether 
the jurors, the judge or the magistrate - after having taken into account all 
the evidence, must be convinced, that is morally certain, of the guilt of the 
accused. If however the accused elects to prove something - which would 
generally be something to negative the charge by raising a reasonable doubt 
- or in those exceptional circumstances where, by express provision of the
law, the burden of proving specific facts is shifted onto the accused - the
accused is regarded as having discharged the evidential burden if he proves
the fact or facts on a balance of probabilities, that is, if whoever is to judge
comes to the conclusion that the accused's hypothesis even if not certainly
true is probably true. A fact is said to be probable if, after taking into consid­
eration all the known circumstances, it is more likely than not to be as stated.
The interplay of "possibility" and "probability" within the context of the de­
gree of proof required in criminal proceedings had been very well described
by Lord Justice Denning in these words:
"Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow 
of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted 
fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong 
against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour, which can be 
dismissed with the sentence 'of course it is possible but not in the least prob­
able' the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that 
will suffice" (cf. Miller v. Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All E.R. 372, 
373-374).
Of course here Lord Denning is referring to the evidence taken as a whole, but 
the same reasoning process can be applied if one were asked a question with 
respect to one fact. To give an example, the question put to a medical witness 
who has just described a stab wound somewhere in the abdomen could be 
something like this: 
"Am I correct in saying that the wound you have just described could have 
been self-inflicted?" 
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The medical witness has, of course, not heard all the other evidence in the 
case, and his answer must be based solely on his examination of the wound 
and the victim in general, and he would be well advised to say so in the first 
place. This is especially true in most of the cases appearing before our courts 
where the persons carrying out the autopsy have no idea of what was found, 
other than the corpse, at the scene of the alleged crime, because they have 
never been at the scene of the crime, nor even seen photographs of it5 • The 
next thing is for the witness to ask himself whether, given the facts as he
knows them from his examination of the victim, he is certain that the wound
was self-inflicted; or whether it is more likely than not (i.e. probable) that it
was self-inflicted; or whether it is possible that it was self-inflicted but, given
the circumstances that he knows, it is not probable that it was so; or, finally,
whether he can rule out completely even the possibility that it was self-in­
flicted. If the witness cannot honestly make up his mind as to any of these
answers, he should candidly say so, and leave the necessary inference to be
made by the judge or the jury after considering all the evidence as a whole. I
am pointing all this out to underline the fact that very often a very quick an­
swer, without reflection and fired, as it were, from the hip can have disastrous
consequences whether for the prosecution or for the defence, and ultimately
disastrous consequences for the proper administration of justice. Incidentally,
there is at least one provision in the Criminal Code which specifically re­
quires a doctor or medical expert to address the question of whether a particu­
lar consequence was probable as distinguished from either possible or certain.
I refer to subsection (2) of section 216 of the said Code, dealing with grievous
bodily harm:
"Where the person injured shall have recovered without ever having been, 
during the illness, in actual danger of life or of the effects mentioned in para­
graph (a) of subsection (1) of this section, it shall be deemed that the harm 
could have given rise to such danger only where the danger was probable in 
view of the nature or the natural consequences of the harm." 
A final point I would like to make is about reference to authority. The practice 
in our courts of criminal justice is that counsel, whether in examination-in­
chief or in cross-examination, are not allowed to confront an expert by citing 
from text-books, articles in learned journals or other publications. They may, 
of course, make use of their contents for the purpose of formulating questions 
and testing hypotheses, but they are not allowed to make known to the jury 
what a particular author has said and whether that author is in agreement or in 
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disagreement with the witness. The reasoning of the courts is simple: whether 
one is referring to Bernard Spilsbury, Hugh Johnson or Keith Simpson, the 
fact is that none of these are giving evidence under oath; and also, unlike the 
expert in the witness box, they may not be cross-examined as to their state­
ments, however authoritative those statements may be in medical circles. 
However, if the medical expert, because of his lack of previous first-hand 
knowledge of particular circumstances, feels that he cannot assume the re­
sponsibility of an opinion without reference to authority, he must be prepared, 
if so requested by the court, to place the book, article or paper at the disposal 
of the parties, who may then examine the witness with reference to other rel­
evant parts of that book, article or paper. 
Mr. Chairman, in this very brief paper I have tried to draw your attention to a 
few of the problems doctors encounter in our Courts of Criminal Justice. These 
problems are ultimately problems more or less of the proper administration of 
justice. After all forensic medicine would be pretty much useless if it did not 
take the form of documentary or oral evidence in a court of law. Allow me 
also to say, lest I be misinterpreted, that I am not in favour of parties to the 
proceedings being allowed to produce ex parte expert evidence. I believe that 
the situation obtaining under our Criminal Code is by far preferable to that 
under the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure, where expert evidence, 
including expert medical evidence, may ultimately boil down to who may pay 
most. Finally I trust that I have not put off any one of you from appearing in 
court, or appearing before me, in your professional capacity, even though as I 
say this I am reminded of a cartoon which appeared years ago (in 1975, I 
believe) in a special edition of Punch which was largely devoted to courts and 
lawyers. It depicted an English barrister, looking pretty much distraught, rushing 
out of the court room and saying to a colleague he met in the corridor: "Six 
ruddy medical experts and they can't even agree on whether the judge is sane". 
Thank you. 
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